

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SUBJECT Miscellaneous Military Information
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reports containing information on the following:

a. Emergency Mobilization of Reserve Army Personnel in 1958

c. Training of Academic Reserves as Signal Corp Officers.

e. Antiaircraft Early Warning (OILA) Unit at Craiova.

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY: Rumania

SUBJECT: Training of Academic Reserves as Signal Corps Officers

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1. The students who enrolled in the Bucharest Faculty of Electronics in 1951 (that is, the class of 1956) received their Academic Reserves training in the Signal Corps. In the summer of 1953, after they had completed two years of work in the Faculty of Electronics, they were called up for 45 days of training with a Signal Corps regiment in Buzau, apparently called "Regimentul 112 Radio," where they received basic training and were taught the rudiments of military communications. The same students again received Signal Corps training in the summer of 1955, when they were attached to a Signal Corps regiment in Someseni and studied the A-7-A, RBM-1 and RAF sets. After the students had completed that second training period, reserve booklets were issued to them as Signal Corps officers, and the numbers of two military trades were marked in the booklets: 42 and 43, which signified, respectively, "tactical officer for line communications" and "tactical officer for wireless communications."

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2. Some of the students with reserve booklets marked as indicated above were called up for reserve military service in the summer of 1956, after they had graduated from the Faculty of Electronics. They were again assigned to the Signal Corps regiment at Buzau, where they spent a month studying the maintenance of RAF, REM, and A-7-A sets, telephone switchboards, and other line communications equipment. The numbers of two new military trades were then noted in the reserve booklets of those who successfully completed the course: 156 and 157, which signified, respectively, "line communications engineer" and "wireless communications engineer." Persons trained in those two military trades were authorized to command workshops for the repair of communications equipment. Such workshops were called RMTs (Atelier Reparatii Material de Transmisiuni).

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COUNTRY: Rumania
SUBJECT: Emergency Mobilization of Reserve Army Personnel
in 1958

DATE OF INFO:

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REFERENCE:

1. On 7 October 1958, the mobilization offices in Bucharest sent orders to certain reserve personnel under their competence, particularly officers, for an immediate call-up. The orders were dispatched to the reservists' places of work and, in cases where reservists had changed their places of work and had not so notified the mobilization office, to their homes. This process continued throughout that night, and the next morning, i.e. on 8 October, there were several dozen men at the offices; most of these men had small suitcases with them, but others had come empty-handed, directly from their jobs. The men were strictly forbidden to leave the offices without permission until that evening, when they were driven, in civilian trucks, to the northern railroad station of Bucharest. The contingent, numbering about 70 to 80 men, mostly officers, entrained for Constanta aboard a reserved coach. In the morning, they reached

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the Palas railroad station, which was then a secondary depot for Constanta through which very little traffic passed, and was then driven by truck to a camp in Viile Noi, south of the city.

2. At the Viile Noi camp, the men from Bucharest met reservists from Constanta and the Dobrogea region who had been mobilized in exactly the same manner. Together with the stragglers who arrived during the days following 9 October, the contingent formed a unit of battalion strength. The camp was that of a cadred unit called "Companie M. A." (i.e. a machine gun and artillery company), whose headquarters had been posted there permanently, and which was responsible for the sector of coastal defense installations between Agigea and Vasila Roaita. Although the reservists had brought the unit up to battalion strength, the sector was not enlarged. All its emplacements were built of concrete, were camouflaged, and remained locked until the contingent moved into them; some were in fields and orchards in uninhabited areas, while others were virtually in the backyards of private homes in the villages. A number of positions contained artillery pieces [redacted], which were kept in place permanently, but the machine guns were stored in the armory of the camp until the beginning of the maneuvers.

3. The battalion consisted of two companies of machine guns [redacted] [redacted] one artillery company, an engineers company, a signals company, and a headquarters platoon. The engineers company was charged with the maintenance of the positions. Its members cleared away the earth from the entrances,

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repaired the camouflage, and laid electric lines and water pipes to them. The signals company consisted of a radio platoon for temporary telephone lines, a platoon for permanent telephone lines (i.e. for those lines that were subsequently left behind), and a workshop for repairing communications equipment, which was manned by one officer and five enlisted men. There were some A-7-A sets, but most of the radio sets held by the company were of the RBM-1 type.

4. For about one week, the reservists were drilled in the operation of their respective equipment (the radios, machine guns, guns, etc.) within the camp grounds. At the end of this period, a stand-by order was received and, shortly thereafter, the battalion was ordered to take up its positions along the shore in preparation for repelling an invasion from the sea. Several hours later, after the engineers company had opened up the positions, the positions were occupied by the battalion's machine gun and artillery companies, whose members remained in them for a week. No other military forces were seen in the sector during this period except units of the Rumanian Navy, which were observed sailing parallel to the coastline. Although much firing and other noises of battle were heard by members of the battalion, they themselves hardly fired a shot, possibly because some of their positions were deep in inhabited areas. At the end of this second week, the battalion was informed that the defending forces had succeeded in repelling the invasion and, therefore, it could leave the positions, which were then locked and camouflaged as they had been previously.
5. It had taken about 42 hours to equip and arm the battalion at the beginning of the maneuvers, using supplies from the emergency stores

(stoc intangibil). All the personal equipment had been brand new when issued and had been classed as top quality; after it was returned to the stores, it was downgraded to at least second class. Shoes and clothing to fit the reservists were generally obtainable, and in only one case in the entire battalion was a soldier excused from the maneuvers because of unsuitable equipment; there were no boots in his size. The reserve officers received the same supplies as the reserve enlisted men, except the officers were issued field rank insignia printed inconspicuously on their shoulder boards. No beds were distributed, and all members of the battalion slept on straw which had been brought in expressly for this purpose; a few officers, however, managed to procure beds. There were no problems regarding rations, and all administrative problems which arose were dealt with efficiently. That everything had been considered beforehand and prearranged was obvious.

6. Before the battalion was disbanded, it was visited by officers from the divisional headquarters responsible for that region. These officers expressed satisfaction with the conduct of the maneuvers, including the mobilization procedure and the logistic aspects of the exercise, and compared this experience with a similar one that had taken place a year before. The 1957 maneuvers, which apparently had been held in the Moldova region and had been the first since World War II, had also included an emergency mobilization of reserve personnel, but were considered a complete failure.
7. The reservists were returned by train and trucks from Constanta to the

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mobilization offices in Lacharost. They were discharged after a notation of their participation in the maneuvers had been recorded in their reserve military booklets.

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COUNTRY : Rumania

SUBJECT : Antiaircraft Early Warning (OILA)
Unit at Craiova

DATE OF INFO

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1. During the period between 1952 and 1955, the headquarters of an antiaircraft early warning (OILA) unit [redacted] was stationed in Craiova. The unit contained about 400 men and was responsible for the air space in the Craiova region as far south and southwest as the Danube. Two types of surveillance media were used in this area: observation and early warning posts (punct OILA), and radar sets (statii radio-locatie). Most of the unit's personnel were employed at the observation posts, of which there were about 50. The posts were often located in remote areas, spaced some 15 to 20 kilometers

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[redacted]

apart, but in prominent positions with unobstructed views. Each post was surrounded by a barbed wire fence about 150 meters long. Within the fence, there was a wooden tower five or six meters high and underground bunkers, which served as signal rooms, living quarters, and a kitchen (the men did their own cooking). Each post was usually manned by six or seven men, including a sergeant, a corporal or lance-corporal, and four or five privates, who men served as observers from sunrise to sunset. The observer at the top of the tower was equipped with an azimuth chart and binoculars; he reported the direction, height, and type of sighted aircraft to the bunker through a speaking tube. This information was then transmitted, usually by radio and in morse code, to unit headquarters. Because of their virtual isolation, the observation posts were sometimes equipped with mules for transport and communication purposes.

2. Only two radar sets were known [redacted] to be operated by the unit: 50X1-HUM
one at Bechet and the other at Corlatel (Vinju Mare District). The 50X1-HUM
Corlatel station was the more important of the two, containing about 50X1-HUM
10 mobile [redacted] radar sets mounted on [redacted]
trucks, which had been fitted with YAGGI-type antennas. [redacted]
[redacted] each was known to have 50X1-HUM

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done some 10,000 kilometers. Apparently, a radar set located at Craiova airfield was also subordinate to the unit.

3. The coordination center of the observation posts and radar stations was located at unit headquarters in Craiova. The center consisted of a large room housing five radio sets (with telephones for emergency purposes), each of which was connected to a number of observation posts that continuously reported aircraft movements in the area. As it was received, the information was noted on a large map of Rumania by a duty officer. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] communications with Bucharest were carried out through another exchange, apparently located at Craiova airfield. The coordination center functioned continuously throughout the day and night and was manned in four-hour shifts.

4. During the time in question, Yugoslav aircraft frequently penetrated Rumanian air space, and the OILA unit at Craiova was very active. At every alert, the commander of the unit and his deputy hurried to Craiova airfield so that they could be in constant contact with the headquarters in Bucharest and could coordinate interceptor activities.
5. The entire motor transport of unit headquarters consisted only of four supply trucks, two motorcycles for dispatch riders, and a car

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for the commander. The need for more transport was obviated by the virtual self-sufficiency of the observation posts and the independent mobile elements included in each radar set.

6. Capt. Benjamin Cojacaru commanded the Craiova OILA unit until early 1955, at which time he was sent to the USSR to study and was replaced by Lt. Maj. Cuza Visan.